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Chapter 1
Tolerance: An Impossible Virtue?
When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union dissolved, many hoped for a “new 
world order,” an order distinguished by significant reduction in internecine 
bloodshed. It would be replaced by continued growth of democracy, mutual con­
cern, and respect for differences. So far, it has not worked out that way. In the for­
mer Yugoslavia, neighbors who once lived in peace, even intermarried—Serbs, 
Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Kosovar Albanians, and Gypsies—are now at each 
other’s throats. Northern Ireland remains bitterly divided between Protestants and 
Catholics, internal strife or mutual enmity marks several former Soviet republics, 
and large-scale massacres have taken place not only in Rwanda but elsewhere 
around the world. There is nothing new in this, only additional instances of con­
flict, strife, and hatred. Long before the Berlin Wall went up or came down, peo­
ple have found it difficult to live together peacefully, unless coerced into a false 
harmony to do so.
Many things create deep divisions. Material interests, such as water rights or 
market access, can set people against each other. Cultural animosities sometimes 
serve as proxies for these. Demanding protection of a group’s cultural heritage, for 
example, seems a less squalid reason for oppression than economic advantage. Be­
hind high-minded and sentiment-filled demands, we often find selfish interests. 
Those grasping for power have their own self-interested reasons for turning small 
differences, disquieting suspicions, and minor irritations into major confrontations.
Still, although all animosities and strife have material consequences, not all 
have their roots in material concerns, greed, or narrow self-interest. Appeals to 
racial purity, linguistic superiority, cultural traditions, sacred places, and the sa­
cred history of the nation continue to create deep divisions. Nor are hostilities 
limited to race or religion or to distinct linguistic, cultural, and geographical 
groups. Any difference, it seems, can produce hatred between and among peoples. 
Hatreds sometimes arise largely, though never simply, because one group cannot 
stand what another feels, thinks, or does. Such bitter animosities may so blind
1
2 Chapter 1
parties to a dispute that they cannot see that they are jeopardizing both their own 
enlightened self-interest and what they hold most dear, as the terrible example of 
religious war proves. Opportunistic ideologues are skilled at cynically blowing 
on the coals of racial, ethnic, or cultural hatreds to further their own interests. 
Once ignited, publics often become so inflamed that they consume even them­
selves, often including those whose fanaticism or cynical grab for power initially 
lit the match.
Animosity, loathing, and abhorrence reveal themselves not only in atrocities, 
though that is common enough. They manifest themselves through sneers, petty 
humiliations, discrimination, persecution, and oppression. Each breeds anger and 
resentment and a powerful urge to retaliate. This, in turn, adds to greater suspi­
cion, fear, distorted thinking, and twisted emotions on all sides. People may con­
tinue to be neighbors but not live as neighbors. Although they live next door, 
there is nothing neighborly about their relations, as the miles of shiny razor wire 
separating Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland attests.
Such hatred and bitterness corrosively eats away at what commonly cements 
communities together. Without the mortar of respect, trust, and tolerance, brick 
scrapes against brick. The result is familiar. Those locked in enmity yearn not only 
to be free from the hated other but to smash them to smithereens. Where those with 
power cannot keep the despised completely oppressed, they may yield to the temp­
tation to rid themselves of the contemptible altogether, to make them “disappear.”
A curious feature of some deep-seated animosities is that, from the outside, 
they often look unfathomable, even faintly ridiculous. From the outside, individ­
uals or groups locked in hatred may seem like two peas in a pod. From the inside, 
however, the similarities only highlight remaining differences, differences that 
come to assume monumental importance. Oddly enough, great differences do not 
always breed the same intense animosity as do small ones.
From our present perspective, for example, the antagonism among various 
Protestant denominations in seventeenth-century England seems incredible. 
Surely, we think, it was mad to let such seemingly minor doctrinal differences 
matter so much. Is it really worth fighting over whether one is baptized as an in­
fant or an adult? Yet we also know that, at the time, differences such as this were 
regarded as supremely important. An entire theology was implicated and there­
fore God’s will on earth. To have allowed other persuasions to flourish without 
resistance would have been to abandon one’s own deepest convictions to do 
God’s work. It would also have seriously endangered one’s own soul. Martin 
Luther’s (perhaps apocryphal) reply to his inquisitors deserves quoting in full; 
“Here I stand, I can do no other. It is not safe for a man to violate his conscience. 
God help me.” Nor was it only theological doctrine that divided English Protes­
tants. The ways in which they thought churches should be governed or precisely 
how one should worship also sometimes led to persecution and bloodshed.
Many who hate and despise each other strike even outsiders as pervasively dif­
ferent: different in race, ethnicity, language, religion, metaphysical commitments.
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kinship systems, aesthetic sensibilities, sexual practices, and customs. Christian 
Serbs and Muslim Kosovar Albanians, for example, differ in religion, ethnicity, 
and language, as do Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. Class and 
caste distinctions also lead to bitter antagonisms. These kinds of deep and often 
divisive differences are neither new nor rare. Modem weaponry coupled with an­
cient savagery, however, can make them especially bratal when they empt in vi­
olence, though machetes remain bratally effective.
Why difference, whether trivial or substantial, should make such a difference 
in how we see and act is deeply puzzling. Many answers suggest themselves, but 
none is fully convincing. Further, there is no reason to expect that there will be a 
single answer or even one set of interrelated answers, however intellectually sat­
isfying that might be. One explanation is the apparent need of many in-groups to 
define themselves against an out-group: “We are ‘we’ because we differ from 
‘you’.’’ The more we resemble you, the greater the need to find some differences, 
however seemingly trivial, to distinguish ourselves and justify ourselves as 
distinctive—and superior. But why the need to feel superior?
“The nonidentity of discemibles’’ entails that, given any two things, there must 
be some discernible difference between them, or there would not be two things, 
only one. It trivially follows that if we speak of Serbs and Croats, Baptists and 
Methodists, Tutsis and Hutus, straight and gay, and so on, there will be dis­
cernible differences. These can be, again, especially from the outside, exceed­
ingly small: Tutsi and Hutu, for instance. Yet, whether great or small, discerned 
differences can drive deep wedges between communities. Each looks across the 
gap separating them with suspicion, fear, and anger that can explode in violence.
Yet we also know that widely divergent groups have lived in peace and har­
mony for generations, even in places now tom apart by mutual enmity. If any­
thing, living in peace is the norm. Otherwise, the world would have been con­
sumed by hatred long ago. Just as we oil squeaky wheels, so distinctions that 
grow into tension and conflict catch our attention.
Deep and pervasive differences alone are, however, not enough to explain the 
harm groups inflict on each other. Nor can it explain why, after generations of 
peaceful coexistence, neighbors turn on each other with such viciousness. We 
know, historically, which differences seem to have led to the greatest hostility, 
namely, religion, race, ethnicity, gender, and customs. We do not, however, have 
anything like an adequate sociological explanation of why these engender such 
animosities. An “other,” as noted previously, helps define who we are in terms of 
whom we are not: We are Scots, not English; Christians, not Jews; straight, not 
gay. The Inuit, who were isolated from other human beings for centuries, have the 
same name for themselves as for humans generally, namely, “Inuit.” There was 
no human “other” to stand in contrast. The mechanism of defining oneself in 
terms of others, however, is not well understood. Although speculative explana­
tory theories abound, none has garnered widespread support. Fortunately, finding 
answers to what causes perceived differences to become transformed into sources
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of hatred belongs more to the social sciences than to philosophy, though philoso­
phers have speculated endlessly about it.
Whether the differences among warring groups are slight or great, the degree 
of animosity in the world remains high. Whether it is higher or lower than before 
the end of the Cold War is difficult to say. Some suggest that the two superpow­
ers kept ethnic, cultural, and racial hatreds in check, preventing them from 
spilling over into violence. This might explain peace in Yugoslavia under Tito. 
Elsewhere, however, the superpowers were only too happy to stir up trouble, as 
in Africa and Southeast Asia. Undeniably, however, bigotry, narrow-mindedness, 
fanaticism, and prejudice pervade today’s world. A catalog of differences fester­
ing into malice in the United States alone could itself fill a book. Even when the 
enmity has not turned violent—and it has done that often enough—it has crippled 
the targets of hatred and society as a whole. One could compile lists for nation 
after nation, community after community. Everywhere there are pleas for recon­
ciliation and—where that fm\%—toleration and tolerance.
While we need research to find out what causes contempt and hatred between 
various groups and what allows them to reconcile and live together harmoniously, 
the need for toleration (the act of tolerating) and for tolerance (the attitude or 
virtue)' will not thereby disappear. Simply knowing what causes what does not 
mean that we can control the causes. Bare toleration will sometimes be all we can 
expect—or should want. No one wishes to live in a homogeneous or lobotomized 
world, a world without difference, passion, and commitment. Yet we think it is 
reasonable to expect, even demand, that individuals and diverse groups^ at least 
tolerate each other.
But, we quickly add, not tolerate all differences. It would be unreasonable- 
worse, utterly wrong—to demand that we should tolerate every divergent attitude, 
belief, or practice. No one, we think, should tolerate cruelty or slavery just be­
cause it happens at a comfortable remove. Can we not say the same about racist, 
sexist, and homophobic attitudes? We should not aspire to exchange unthinking 
bigotry for mindless toleration of everything.
We therefore need to sort out what tolerance implies, the circumstances in 
which it arises as a live option, and when it is (and is not) defensible, for under­
standing the limits of tolerance is part of understanding the scope of its justifica­
tion. So far, tolerance has resisted any consistent or agreed-on analysis and de­
fense. It has proven to be—as the subtitle of an excellent anthology on it 
implies—“an elusive virtue.”^ One contributor calls it highly “paradoxical.”'* An­
other goes so far as to say that it is “an impossible virtue.”^
Tolerance and toleration appear elusive not only because of their apparent im­
possibility but also because of their apparently inherent instability. Tolerance 
seems to occupy a no-man’s-land between intolerance on the one hand and com­
plete acceptance on the other. That is, it seems to exist in an unstable moment like 
that between the point at which, when looking at the familiar duck/rabbit draw­
ing, we can only see the duck and then, in the blink of an eye, can only see the
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rabbit. Tolerance seems equally unstable, equally fleeting. It either collapses back 
into intolerance or swiftly moves to acceptance or at least indifference. In the Re­
public, Socrates says of opinion that it rolls around between ignorance and 
knowledge, being neither one nor the other and impossible to pin down. Toler­
ance seems like that. We simply cannot seem to make it stand still long enough 
to pin it down.
Nor does everyone accept that tolerance is a good thing, and certainly not that 
it should be elevated to the status of a virtue, that is, as a morally desirable char­
acter trait. Some think that tolerance either requires or leads us to become skep­
tics, doubters, or indifferent spectators to our own lives. Someone who did not suf­
fer from doubt was the French priest, then bishop, Jacques Bossuet (1627-1704). 
In 1598, the Edict of Nantes granted Protestants in France the right to worship 
openly. When it was revoked in 1685, Protestant pastors were forced to renounce 
their calling or face severe punishment, including death. Bossuet gave a classic de­
fense of intolerance in threatening the Protestant clergy: “I have the right to per­
secute you,” he said, “because I am right and you are wrong.”® There is no lack of 
certainty or indifference here, and that, some critics say, is a good thing, for toler­
ance, they argue eats away at the very things that give our lives meaning and sub­
stance. If tolerance is a good at all, it pertains only to the small, insignificant things 
in life. It will otherwise sap the strength of our deepest convictions.
Others reject tolerance because it does not go far enough. It is a half measure 
for the powerful and arrogant, who preach tolerance provided that they—and they 
alone—decide who and what to tolerate. What we need to do, these critics say, is 
move beyond tolerance and toleration to respect and positive appreciation of deep 
differences, to recognize and celebrate difference. For this to happen, however, 
we will have to move beyond the pretensions of contemporary liberal thought 
with its emphasis on individualism, rights, means-end rationality, and selves 
emptied of all meaning but that which they can provide on their own. We must 
move to a new, perhaps postmodern, sensibility.
If tolerance is not universally celebrated as a virtue or attitude, neither is toler­
ation universally recommended as an act or practice. If we truly believe that our 
own way of life is best, why should we tolerate—that is, put up with—inferior, 
maybe corrupt, ways? Champions of toleration themselves do not show forbear­
ance to absolutely everything. They, too, draw lines. They just draw them at dif­
ferent places. The language of tolerance and toleration, critics conclude, simply 
masks different judgments about where those lines should be drawn.
This is an essay in social and political philosophy. I will, therefore, largely ig­
nore questions of tolerance arising in interpersonal relations. I will occasionally 
use examples drawn from this sphere because of their familiarity. Clearly, this is 
possible only if we deploy the notions of tolerance and intolerance in similar 
ways. I believe that we do. Nor is this surprising, for interpersonal moral reflec­
tion and social and political reflections are not radically discontinuous, though 
there are important differences of focus and emphasis. Justice and rights generally
6 Chapter 1
figure less prominently in interpersonal affairs than in social and political ones, 
while boorish or insensitive behavior figure less importantly in social and politi­
cal affairs than in interpersonal ones.
This is not to say that considerations in one sphere are absent from the other. In 
our personal relations, we are often as deeply concerned about the social and po­
litical attitudes of people we know well as we are of their actions. We may find it 
difficult, for instance, to sustain a friendship with someone whom we know har­
bors bigoted thoughts or expresses racial antipathy even if he never otherwise acts 
on his thoughts and antipathy. Politically speaking, this may be largely (though not 
completely) beneath notice; in our personal interactions, it looms large.
Philosophers only interpret the world, Marx famously says, adding that the 
point is to change it. That philosophers only interpret the world means no more 
than that they are doing their job. They are ill-equipped to do more and are likely 
to make a mess of things when they try. Gaining a better philosophical under­
standing of appeals to tolerance may help us understand both the possibilities and 
the limits of intelligent change.
Philosophers introduce novel terms or ideas into public discourse at their peril; 
usually, they work with words, phrases, and notions already in use. They shape 
and refine existing currency, both old and new, and return them brightly polished 
to contemporary service as if freshly minted. This does not mean that philoso­
phers simply tidy up ordinary language. They also systematically explore not 
only the linguistic conditions for a term’s application but also its connections with 
related concepts. The aim is not dictionary making but conceptual clarification 
and understanding. Sometimes a philosopher can transform our understanding of 
the meaning, implications, and justifications for ready-at-hand terms. This might 
mean taking a word or phrase already in use and giving it a more central place in 
our thinking. Or it might mean reshaping language and so what we think. Words 
then take on new meaning and importance.
Most words in ordinary language (or even learned discourse, such as medieval 
Latin) do not have a precise sense, unless someone deliberately assigns one. 
Many words, especially those that do not name common objects (and even here 
the exceptions abound), are marked by ambiguity and vagueness, at least until 
they are used in a specific context. This is both understandable and unproblem­
atic. Words are tools. We do things with them. Provided that they get the job done, 
we are not always too fussy about giving them a precise sense. Just as we use 
screwdrivers as levers and as punches, so we use ordinary words in a variety of 
ways, usually connected but often straying from their original employment. If it 
matters, we can always assign a word or phrase an exact sense, as we do in sci­
ence, mathematics, and certain phrases in legal contracts. Often, however, it does 
not matter, and we get on perfectly well without precise definitions.
Context often removes ambiguity and vagueness. When engineers discuss “tol­
erances” of a particular fitting, for instance, we are not thrown into hopeless con­
fusion. This example illustrates an important point, for in a eertain context, a
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word that might be vague or generally ambiguous can have a precise meaning. 
The danger lies only in thinking that it always has the same precise sense in all 
contexts. We need to remind ourselves, moreover, that we simply do not always 
need precision. Everyone can distinguish day from night and dusk from both, but 
is there unanimity about when dusk begins and ends? And how, precisely, does 
dusk differ from twilight? Everything just said is true of the word “tolerance.” As 
we will see in chapter 6, it has been around a long time.
NOTES
1. I will distinguish these terms more finely in chapter 3. Usually, however, they can be 
used interchangeably because the context makes clear which is meant.
2. “Groups” is not a happy word choice. I use it to refer to varied social groupings, such 
as families, communities, ethnic groups, castes, religions, political parties, pressure 
groups, unions, and the state. It would be tedious to provide this list, or portions of it, re­
peatedly. A group, incidentally, need not be institutionalized, as will be discussed later.
3. See the collection of essays in David Heyd, ed.. Toleration: An Elusive Virtue 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
4. John Horton, “Toleration as a Virtue,” in Toleration, ed. Heyd, 28^3.
5. Bernard Williams, “Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?” in Toleration, ed. Heyd, 
18-27.
6. Quoted in Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic High­
lands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), 7.
